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ARTICLES
INFORMED CONSENT TO THE
MEDICAL TREATMENT OF
MINORS: LAW AND PRACTICE
Lawrence Schlamt
Joseph P. Wood, M.D.tt
I. INTRODUCTION
Children who are legally too young to give con-
sent to treatment must still be treated as individu-
als whose rights as members of society are not
solely dependent on the legal definition of the
day.'
NOT THAT LONG AGO, those under twenty-one were
thought to be incapable of consenting to medical treatment. Pa-
rental approval was necessary or physicians might be liable in
damages for non-consensual battery. 2 This was the case be-
t Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. The authors
wish to acknowledge Shannon B. Rigby (J.D., N.I.U., 2000) for her invaluable re-
search and assistance in preparing this Article for publication, and Linda Condon
(J.D., N.LU., 1999) and Matthew Hevrin (J.D., N.,U., 1999) for their research in this
area in a Child Law Seminar.
tt Assistant Professor of Emergency Medicine, University of Illinois College of
Medicine.
' J.P.H. Shield & J.D. Baum, Children's Consent to Treatment: Listen to the
Children - They Will Have to Live With the Decision, 308 Brarr. MED. J. 1182, 1183
(1994).
2 See In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765, 781 (Wash. 1962) (holding that a court may
not subject a child to a surgical operation over the objection of her parents). The
common law rule is that minors are forbidden to consent to medical treatment. Still,
"[t]he requirement that medical care be provided to a minor only with the consent of
the minor's parent or guardian remains the general rule... throughout the United
States." American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 801 (Cal. 1997)
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cause, until the early 1800s, children were considered chattels
of their parents, particularly the father.3 Prior to that time, chil-
dren had no rights and parents reared their children without any
governmental restraints;4 the duty to support and protect chil-
dren was a moral duty only.
Not until the advent of the Industrial Revolution, and the
urbanization of the United States it brought, was there general
rise in benevolence and concern for children. Their increased
exposure to urban vices, such as poverty, coupled with public
fears of impending truancy and delinquency, led to the in-
creased use of the parens patrie doctrine.5 Under this doctrine,
the state had a right and a duty to override parental autonomy
and act as a surrogate parent where necessary to provide protec-
tion for the life and general health of a neglected or abused
child. 6 Thus, by the time of the decision in Wallace v. Labrenz,7
in 1952, it was no longer unusual for a court to order a state-
appointed guardian to consent to medical care for children, even
if the parents objected.
Today, however, as a result of the "mature minor" doctrine,
doctors may now treat children, even in the absence of parental
consent or a court order, because it has become reasonable to
assume that mature children are capable of providing informed
consent pertaining to their own medical treatment.8 Minors may
(holding unconstitutional a statute requiring parental consent or judicial authorization
for pregnant minors to obtain an abortion).
3 See 1 LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 10 (Donald T. Kramer ed., 2d ed. 1994)
(describing early American attitudes relating to children).
4 Seeid.
5 See id. at 10-11.
6 See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Power of Court or Other Public Agency to
Order Medical Treatment Over Parental Religious Objections for Child Whose Life
is Not Immediately Endangered, 21 A.L.R. 5th 248, 256-57 (1994) (providing that
"in a proper case, the state may, through a court or otherwise, intervene to insure that
a child is given medical treatment necessary for the protection of its life or limb, in-
cluding treatment for mental or emotional ills, where the custodian of the child has
unreasonably refused to allow such treatment").
7 104 N.E.2d 769 (111. 1952) (holding that a child whose parents refused to
permit a life-saving blood transfusion was a "neglected child").
8 See Avron M. Kreichman, The Adolescent's Right to Psychiatric Care, in
JUVENILE PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 381, 385 (Rosner & Schwartz eds., 1989) (dis-
cussing "mature minor" doctrine and the capacity to understand the treatment as the
primary concern with minor's consent to the proposed treatment). For a more detailed
discussion of the mature minor doctrine, see Garry S. Sigman & Carolyn O'Connor,
Exploration for Physicians of the Mature Minor Doctrine, 119 J. PEDIATRICS 520
(1991).
[Vol. 10:141
INFORMED CONSENT TO MINORS
be recognized as competent based upon a variety of factors, in-
cluding their age, maturity, intelligence, and the nature and
risks of the proposed treatment.9 Even if parents ultimately dis-
agree with the treatment given, the doctor is still protected
against liability by the doctrine. Still, it is essential that physi-
cians have a clear understanding of (a) how to adequately de-
termine and record indications of the maturity and decision-
making competence of minor patients; and (b) how to be as-
sured that one has properly communicated with and obtained
knowing and intelligent medical decisions from competent child
patients.
Part I of this Article discusses the requirement of informed
consent when treating minors, and describes the evolution of the
"mature minor" doctrine, an exception to this requirement. Part
II examines research on child development and cognition for
two reasons: to establish a standard of competence in children,
and for insight into how physicians might make more accurate
judgments of maturity before treating children in the absence of
parental consent.
Part Ill analyzes significant decisions on the competence of
minors to consent to their own medical treatment. It describes
the "multi-factor analysis" judges commonly use in resolving
those questions. Part IV discusses the continuing problems in
applying the "mature minor" doctrine. Part V addresses the
statutory exceptions under which minors may consent to treat-
ment notwithstanding the "mature minor" doctrine. Part VI con-
cludes with recommendations for how physicians might better
"inform" and receive consent under the "mature minor" doc-
trine, and thus minimize misunderstanding or exposure to liabil-
ity.
9 Where, for example, a seventeen-year-old girl suffered from back pain and
proceeded on her own to an osteopath, and as a result of treatment had to be hospital-
ized, lost normal bladder control and some sensation in her buttocks and legs, the jury
found no liability because she had the maturity, education, experience, ability, and
judgment to knowingly consent to treatment. See FAY A. ROsOvsKY, CONSENT TO
TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GuiDE 262-64 (2d ed. 1990).
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H. THE INFORMED CONSENT REQUIREMENT
AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE "MATURE
MINOR" DOCTRINE
There are better means for protecting parental
autonomy than silencing children. 1
0
The "autonomy of the individual in medical decision-
making" is protected through the requirement of informed con-
sent.11 This ensures a "genuine respect for human dignity"'
12
since "every person has the right to determine what is done to
his or her own body."'13 Without patient consent to treatment,
doctors may be sued for battery.14 Consent, however, gives the
physician a privilege that protects against liability for this tort
10 Susan D. Hawkins, Protecting the Rights and Interests of Competent Minors
in Litigated Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2075, 2115 (1996).
11 Alan Miesel & Mark Kuczewski, Legal & Ethical Myths About Informed
Consent, 156 ARcHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2521, 2521. See also Lawrence 0. Gostin,
Informed Consent, Cultural Sensitivity, & Respect for Persons, 274 JAMA 844
(1995) (stating that informed consent is a "universal expression of respect for per-
sons" recognized by The Nuremberg Code, Helsinki IV, and the Council of Interna-
tional Organizations of Medical Sciences).
12 This right is "broadly perceived to be a morally necessary method of demon-
strating genuine respect for human integrity." Gostin, supra note 11, at 844.
13 Elizabeth Cauffinan & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive & Affective Influ-
ences on Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1763, 1765 (1995). See also
Anthony Szczygiel, Beyond Informed Consent, 21 OHio N.U. L. REv. 171, 184
(1994) (recognizing that "courts built the legal doctrine of consent to medical treat-
ment from the ancient notion that one's body should not be touched without one's
approval") (citing Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). The
concept of autonomy is based on "17th century political philosophy" and English
common law. In the modem era, even the Nuremberg Trials held that consent was an
international requirement for medical treatment.
14 Judge Benjamin Cardozo said: 'Every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what can be done with his own body; and a surgeon
who continues to operate without his patient's consent commits an assault for which
he is liable for damages." Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y.
1914) (holding that surgery without proper consent constitutes the trespassory tort of
assault). If there is no consent at all, the tort is battery. See, e.g., McNeil v. Brewer,
710 N.E.2d 1285, 1288-89 (IlL. App. Ct. 1999) (finding that an inmate's inclusion in a
medical study did not constitute offensive conduct, an element of battery, when no
blood was drawn without the inmate's consent). See also Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1,
8 (Cal. 1972) (discussing the differences between battery and negligence theories of
conduct in the context of medical malpractice) (citing Jennifer F. Skeels, Note, In re
E.G.: The Right of Mature Minors in Illinois to Refuse Life-saving Medical Treat-
ment, 21 LOY. U. Cm. L.J. 1199, 1204 (1990)); Hawkins, supra note 10, at 2094
(explaining informed consent doctrine at common law).
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so long as patients are informed of the nature and consequences
of treatment,15 and give knowing and intelligent consent to the
specific procedures the doctor will perform.'
T
Doctors, therefore, must provide the patient with a "reason-
able amount of information" for the patient to be able to make a
decision about the treatment. 17 "Informed consent," a notion
which "surfaced, seemingly out of nowhere," 18 can only follow
after a discussion of "the nature of the proposed treatment pro-
cedures, possible alternative treatments, and the nature and the
degree of the risk and benefits involved in accepting or rejecting
treatment."19 The doctor must communicate this information in
15 There may be a "dispute regarding the quality and nature of information that
must be disclosed as a condition for securing 'informed consent' . . . [but all agree
that] no medical care should be provided without first explaining the nature of the
treatment and the accompanying risks, at least for adult patients." Andrew Popper,
Averting Malpractice by Information: Informed Consent in the Pediatric Treatment
Environment, 47 DEPAuL L. REV. 819, 820-21 (citations omitted) (citing inter alia
DAVID W. LOUISELL & HAROLD WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE [ 22.01, at 22-4
(1990) (stating that the information should include the diagnosis, the contemplated
procedure, the risks, the prospects of success, the prognosis if the procedure is not
performed, and alternative methods of treatment). See also Salgo v. Leland Stanford
Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (holding that a
duty existed to obtain not only consent but "informed" consent, including consent to
such risks as paralysis, by disclosing facts necessary to make an intelligent decision).
16 However, if a patient gives a doctor consent to operate, for example, on one
ear and the doctor decides to operate on the other ear, the doctor is liable for battery.
See Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905) (patient consented to an operation
on one ear, but during the operation the doctor discovered that the other ear was in
worse condition, and operated successfully on that ear).
17 Miesel & Kuczewski, supra note 11, at 2523 (observing that the doctor must
give as much information as "measured by customary professional practice"). The
question of what information should have been disclosed by a "reasonable health care
provider" was traditionally a matter for expert witnesses because this was viewed as a
medical question. See Derek Kroft, Informed Consent: A Comparative Analysis, 6 J.
INT'L L. & PRAC. 457, 461 (1997) (citing William H. Altman et al., Autonomy, Com-
petence, and Informed Consent in Long Term Care: Legal and Psychological Per-
spectives, 37 VILL. L. REv. 1671, 1683 (1992)). Some jurisdictions, however, reject
this approach for a patient-oriented approach which shifts the focus to what a reason-
able patient would need to know, a standard which does not need expert testimony,
easing the patient's burden of proof. See id. (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772 (D.C. 1972), which involved a physician who did not disclose the possible con-
sequence of paralysis).
18 Miesel & Kuczewski, supra note 11, at 2521 (citing JAY KATZ, THE SILENT
WORLD OF PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 60 (1984)).
19 Lynn E. Lebit, Note, Compelled Medical Procedures Involving Minors and
Incompetents and Misapplication of the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 7 J. L. &
HEALTH 107, 111 (1992-93) (discussing the doctor-patient relationship developed
from the doctrine of informed consent and substitute judgment).
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a way that the patient can understand.20 This should include a
warning of "risks to which a reasonable person in the patient's
position would be likely to attach significance.",2' Consent is
considered informed, therefore, if given "knowingly, compe-
tently, and voluntarily. 22 If a doctor does not provide enough
information to properly allow a patient to make an informed
decision about treatment, but the patient nevertheless gives con-
sent, the doctor still may be liable for negligent behavior.23
20 "[Ilnformed consent law requires insight into a patient's specific capacity to
make decisions regarding health care rather than her overall competency for personal
functioning." Kroft, supra note 17, at 460.
21 How Far Should GPS Go In Getting Consent? PULSE, Apr. 25, 1998, at 2.
Informed consent also includes the patient's right to refuse treatment. See Miesel &
Kuczewski, supra note I1, at 2524 (observing that "physicians are obligated to obtain
not only informed consent but also informed refusal"). The process of giving the
patient information about the treatment, therefore, does not mean that the patient does
not have the right to refuse treatment. If a patient does not want the information, then
the patient must sign a waiver. See id. at 2525. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (extending the duty to disclose to include medical alterna-
tives and risks involved with a recommended medical choice).
22 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 13, at 1765-66 (noting also the use of in-
formed consent doctrine when Miranda rights are given). Proper consent can only
follow if the patient: a) has decision-making capacity, b) has received adequate in-
formation in terms of what a reasonable patient would need to know under similar
circumstances to make an intelligent decision, and c) made her decision without
fraud, coercion, or duress. See Kroft, supra note 17, at 459, 462-63 (citing PAUL S.
APPELBAUM, M.D. ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRAC-
TICE 49 (1987)). The information required includes the medical diagnosis, steps pre-
ceding diagnosis, the nature of the procedure, the risks of treatment, the probability of
success and the expected benefits, the treatment alternatives, chosen from medically
acceptable options, and the risks of informed refusal. See id. at 462-63. The nature of
the risks to be disclosed varies according to the nature and magnitude of the proce-
dure. See id. at 462 (citing PAUL S. APPELBAUM, M.D. Er AL., INFORMED CONSENT:
LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 49 (1987)). See also Wenger v. Oregon
Urology Clinic, 796 P.2d 376 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that defendants failed to
inform plaintiff properly of several available treatment alternatives and used a proce-
dure which caused an infection, ultimately leading to the amputation of the plaintiffs
penis). Finally, the decision must be requested and made in a non-threatening man-
ner, and the patient must consent to the chosen treatment voluntarily, without force,
coercion, fraud, or duress. See Kroft, supra note 17, at 463 (citing William H. Altman
et al., Autonomy, Competence, and Informed Consent in Long Term Care: Legal and
Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REv. 1671, 1684 (1992)). See also Relf v.
Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974) (discussing numerous poor people
who were improperly told that if they did not agree to sterilization, they would lose a
portion of their welfare benefits).
23 See Popper, supra note 15, at 821. See generally Lebit, supra note 19 (dis-
cussing informed consent liability). See generally Hawkins, supra note 10, at 2093-
94 (noting requirements imposed on physicians).
(Vol. 10:141
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"Thus, it does not take a great leap in logic to conclude that
the right to be informed about the nature of the medical treat-
ment is fundamental. It is therefore worth inquiring why a right
so basic in the United States legal system fades away to noth-
ingness for most people seventeen and under., 24 The reason
may be that, until the 19th century, children were considered the
chattel of their parents; 25 parents were required to provide in-
formed consent for any medical treatment the child needed.26
During the industrial revolution, social reformers brought atten-
tion to the needs of children, and legislatures began to pass
child labor and compulsory education laws.27 Nonetheless, prior
to the 1960s, minors were not considered capable of providing
informed consent. It was believed they could not make compe-
tent decisions.28
Children's rights were strengthened in 1967, when the Su-
preme Court determined that the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process clause also applied to children.2 9 Children were now
considered "'persons' under our Constitution," 30 and were given
rights such as freedom of expression. In Tinker v. Des Moines
School District,31 for example, the court said, "Students in
school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitu-
24 Id. at 821-22 (citation omitted).
25 See id. at 830; Hawkins, supra note 10, at 2076 (discussing the history of
children's rights in the United States); In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ohio C.P.
Lucas County 1962).
26 Parents were also considered to have a moral duty to protect their children. As
a result, the law did not always act in the best interests of the child. For instance,
Massachusetts enacted the Stubborn Child Law of 1646 which permitted parents to
obtain a state reprimand for children who were stubborn. The parents could even seek
capital punishment for poor behavior. See LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 3,
at 10 (citing SHURTLEFF, RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSA-
mHUSEmTs BAY IN NEw ENGLAND 1628-86, 101 (1854)).
27 See Hawkins, supra note 10, at 2076 (discussing the efforts of the industrial
era's children's rights movement).
28 See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing
the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1083,
1095, 1103 (1991) (defending a case for abolition of the juvenile court system based
on the changes in society's view of a minor's capabilities and place in society).
29 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1967) (holding that even if a juvenile de-
linquency hearing does not meet all of the requirements for an adult hearing, children
still must have due process and fair treatment, including assistance of counsel, the
privilege against self-incrimination, no double jeopardy, and the right to confront
their accusers).
30 Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
3' 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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tion. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the state
must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obliga-
tions to the state.",
32
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment changed the voting age
from twenty-one years of age to eighteen in 1971, and changes
in the age of majority followed in most states.33 Eighteen-year-
olds were now able to make their own health care decisions and
provide informed consent to treatment. 34 Finally, by 1979, in
abortion and contraception cases, the Supreme Court recognized
that minors had a right to privacy.35 Nevertheless, the majority
of medical treatments performed on minors continue to require
parental consent; 36 there is not even a requirement that doctors
inform children about the treatment they are to receive.
37
32 Id. at 511.
33 See, e.g., DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATE-
RIALS 127-29 (2d ed. 1997) (explaining that the age of majority was, to a significant
extent, changed to compensate for a situation where, in Vietnam for example, those
dying were nineteen years old yet could not vote, and because of youthful service in
the civil rights movement).
34 See Kreichman, supra note 8, at 382 (noting the age of majority). See also
Isabel Traugott & Ann Alpers, In Their Own Hands: Adolescents Refusal of Medical
Treatment, 151 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 922, 924 (1997) (provid-
ing that children over 18 are granted the right to give informed consent by statute).
35 See Hawkins, supra note 10, at 2097-99. See also Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1977) (striking down a New York statute requiring that
only minors over 16 could obtain contraception, and then, only through a licensed
pharmacist); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (striking Massachusetts law re-
quiring parental consent for abortion for unmarried women under 18); Planned Par-
enthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (stating that minors do not need parental
consent for abortion during the first trimester). Thus, no parental consent is necessary
for minors to receive treatment in these areas, although some states require a judicial
bypass. See Maggie O'Shaughnessy, The Worst of Both Worlds? Parental Involve-
ment Requirements and the Privacy Rights of Mature Minors, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1731,
1740-41 (1966). The judicial bypass allows the courts to determine whether the mi-
nor is mature enough to make the decision to have an abortion without parental con-
sent. If the minor is not mature enough, then the court may also allow the abortion if
it is in the minor's best interest to do so without parental consent. See id.at 1741.
36 See Jennifer L. Rosato, The Ultimate Test of Autonomy Should Minors Have
a Right to Make Decisions Regarding Life-Sustaining Treatment?, 49 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1, 17 (1996) (stating the legal limits on a minor's decision-making rights
regarding life-sustaining treatment); see also Traugott & AMpers, supra note 33, at
923-24 (providing that it is a matter of clinical practice for physicians to seek
parental consent).
37 See Popper, supra note 15, at 831-32 (reasoning that the first step towards
granting minors rights in medical treatment is to require "informed assent," a middle
ground in which the minor would not be the decision-maker, but would still be in-
formed about the treatment).
INFORMED CONSENT TO MINORS
In one case, a doctor was sued for performing an abortion
on a sixteen-year-old girl without her knowledge.38 The court
held that the doctor had no duty to even inform her of the pro-
cedure because her mother had already given informed consent.
The court reasoned that even being told about the abortion
could have been "disturbing to her.
' 3
The short of it is that in the United States the question
of how to inform children of the nature, risks, and al-
ternatives prior to medical treatment is not yet on cen-
ter stage for public dialogue. It should be. In an envi-
ronment where the potential for medical malpractice li-
ability has become a focal point for those bent on tort
limitation through tort reform, it is troubling that this
same group of tort-sensitive professionals has failed to
take into account not only the basic rights dialogue in-
volving children but also the potential liability see-
nario.40
In truth, "few courts recognize that children have interests
independent of those of their parents or the state; ' 41 the Four-
teenth Amendment has been interpreted to protect the "liberty
interest[s] [of parents] in the custody and management of their
children, [and has given them] a corresponding duty to provide
care." 42 The requirement of parental consent to treatment is also
justified because parents are presumed to act in the best inter-
ests of the child due to "natural bonds of affection,' 43 because
of the belief that children are incapable of making medical deci-
38 See Powers v, Floyd, 904 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing a
case where an abortion was performed on a mentally challenged minor with the writ-
ten consent of her mother, but without any information being given to the patient
herself).
39 See id. at 718.
4o See Popper, supra note 15, at 824 (citation omitted).
41 Hawkins, supra note 10, at (citing Hillary Rodham Clinton, Children Under
the Law, 43 HARv. EDUC. REv. 487, 491-92 (1973); Elizabeth J. Sher, Note, Choos-
ing for Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Between Parents and the
State, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 157, 168-69 (1983)).
42 Traugott & Alpers, supra note 34, at 924 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1943).
43 Id.
2000]
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sions,44 because parents usually pay for the cost of the treat-
ments, 4 and because parents are presumed to "possess what a
child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment
required for making life's difficult decisions." 46 In addition,
[b]eyond the obvious importance of parental or guardianship
control, the potential for liability, the need for uniformity in
dealing with large number of patients, and the challenges of
adult to child communication, lies a deeper resistance to the
declaration of the right [of children to consent] - the fear that
children, empowered with information and the right to be heard
(dispositively), will make problematic, illogical, irrational, deci-
sions.
47
Therefore, in order to preserve family integrity as well as pro-
tect children from themselves, the courts support parental deci-
sion-making in matters related to their children's care.48
When children are quite young, of course, it is reasonable
that parents would be considered the best decision-makers with
regard to their medical treatment.49 Support for parental auton-
omy in this regard is also intuitively understandable when deal-
ing with families in which there would appear to be insignifi-
cant likelihood of child abuse. However, as the child grows
older and is more capable of making decisions, reconciling pa-
rental authority with the child's best interests becomes more
complicated.50 Actually, in the 1990s, "with the classic family
44 See Rosato, supra note 36, at 18. See also RozovsKY, supra note 9, at 257
(providing background of the traditional view of minor's incapacity to consent to
medical treatment).
45 See Rosato, supra note 36, at 18 (citing Lacey v. Laird, 139 N.E.2d 25, 30
(Ohio, 1956)).
46 Hawkins, supra note 10, at 2081 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 582, 602
(1979)).
47 Popper, supra note 15, at 834 (citing Gary B. Melton, Children's Consent: A
Problem in Law and Social Science, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 1, 4-11
(Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983).
48 See Gary B. Melton, Children's Consent: A Problem in Law and Social Sci-
ence, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 1, 4-11 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds.,
1983) (citing Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Del. 1991).
49 Indeed, if the doctor believes that the "information would undermine, rather
than promote, the goals of informed consent," by complicating or hindering treatment
or causing psychological damage, she can withhold information using the "therapeu-
tic privilege." Miesel & Kuczewski, supra note 11, at 2525.
[Vol. 10:141
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unit having so often disintegrated[, the child may have a more
stable and balanced viewpoint than either parent. 51
As a result, the "mature minor" doctrine was developed to
ensure treatment of minors (1) when parental consent may cause
intra-family conflict or be difficult to obtain,52 and (2) to protect
physicians who treat mature minors. The doctrine permits minor
children to seek required medical treatment with confidentiality,
and ensures that they receive treatment in situations in which
requiring parental consent would prevent them from doing so.
53
Legal privileges are extended to minors by allowing minors
"who can understand the nature and consequences of the medi-
cal treatment offered" the right to consent to or refuse treat-
ment.
54
50 [M]erely because children vary in their developmental capacities does
not mean they are any less entitled to understandable information needed to
express an opinion on the plan of treatment . . . [Given) the expanding
number and variety of exceptions regarding informed consent, the increase
in controversial treatment refusals supported by the courts and public opin-
ion, the acceptance in the international community of the right (albeit hol-
low in most of those countries) to be informed, and the views in the medi-
cal community regarding the health value of information, consideration of
an expansive assent rule seems only prudent.
Popper, supra note 15, at 832 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the capacity of
children regarding legal matters absent parental participation, see Commonwealth v.
Fogan, 296 A.2d 755 (Pa. 1972) (finding that the totality of the circumstances test is
appropriate when considering minors' rights with respect to waiver of the right to
counsel); Commonwealth v. Moses, 287 A.2d 131 (Pa. 1971) (holding that whether a
sixteen-year-old intelligently waived his right to counsel is an issue of fact); Theriault
v. State, 223 N.W.2d 850 (Wis. 1974) (holding that the absence of a parent or legal
guardian does not render a murder confession given by a juvenile inadmissible per se.
See also In re Green, 292 S.2d 387, 392 (Pa. 1972) (when the life of the minor is not
imperiled, the personal choices of the minor should be central to treatment decisions)
(minor was competent because he understood the benefits of treatment, the risks, and
the consequences of non-treatment); Traugott & Alpers, supra note 33, at 924 (con-
cluding that promotion of "the best interests of any patient, child or adult, means
merely that the expected benefits of a medical intervention should outweigh the pos-
sible harms").
51 Shield & Baum, supra note 1, at 1183 (discussing justification for allowing a
minor to make his or her own decisions with regard to medical care).
52 See, e.g., DAVIS ET AL., supra note 33, at 157 (adding that the "mature minor"
doctrine extends legal privileges associated with adulthood to adolescents).
53 Hawkins, supra note 10, at 2124 (discussing protections afforded by common
law "mature minor" doctrine).
m Carolyn O'Connor, Illinois Adolescents' Rights to Confidential Health Care,
82 ILL. B.J. 24, 26 (1994).
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The Illinois Supreme Court, for example, adopted the doc-
trine in 1989. 55 Based upon an interpretation of two statutes -
the Consent by Minors to Medical Procedures Act56 and the
Emancipation of Mature Minors Act 57 - the court determined
that "the legislature did not intend that there be an absolute 18-
year-old age barrier prohibiting minors from consenting to
medical treatment." 58 The court also relied on precedent which
concluded that "no 'bright line' age restriction of 18 is tenable
in restricting the rights of mature minors, whether the rights are
based on constitutional or other grounds." 59 In order to over-
come the presumption of immaturity, there must be clear and
convincing evidence that "the minor is mature enough to appre-
ciate the consequences of her actions, and that the minor is ma-
ture enough to exercise the judgment of an adult[.] '60 However,
neither judicial decisions nor statutes provide specific guidance
for determining in advance when a minor is "mature." 61 The
standard for maturity is left to the discretion of trial courts be-
cause "cases will arise in circumstances so varied, so complex,
and so hard to anticipate that no one could write rules that
would accurately guide decision-makers to correct results and
only to correct results in a sufficiently large number of the
cases."
62
" In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322. (Ill. 1989) (granting a seventeen-year-old girl the
right to refuse a blood transfusion based upon her religious beliefs)
56 See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/1 (West 1993) (defining minors' rights
with respect to medical procedures).
57 See 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 30/1 et seq. (West 1999).
58 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 326.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 327-28. The court also established a "sliding scale analysis" to deter-
mine when the state should intervene, should it wish to do so. If the treatment is life-
threatening, for example, the state's interest is higher; but as the risks of treatment
decline, and the maturity and the age of the minor increase, the state has less author-
ity to intervene. The rights of the minor also must be balanced against the state's
interests in preserving life, protecting third party interests, preventing suicide, and
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession. See id.
61 See Suellyn Scarnecchia & Julie Kunce Field, Judging Girls: Decision-
making in Parental Consent to Abortion Cases, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 75, 77-80
(1995) (discussing the origins and interpretations of the "maturity" and "best inter-
ests" tests).
62 Id. at 81 (quoting Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Cus-
tody and the UMDA 's Best Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2215, 2243 (1991)).
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11. WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED MATURE?
[Mjaturation is a process that develops at different
rates for different individuals; there is no arbitrary
boundary between the incompetent child and the compe-
tent child or adult.63
Fortunately, there is a wide array of available developmen-
tal research helpful in understanding and determining an ado-
lescent's maturity, decision-making abilities and competency.
Jean Piaget, the early, influential researcher into children's cog-
nitive development, studied their evolution toward sufficient
maturity to make adult-like decisions, 64 and how and when they
achieve that status. Piaget suggested that this development oc-
curs in several stages, based on when children perceive new
events and how they place these new events into preexisting
patterns of thought.65 Piaget found, for example, that children
between eleven and fifteen could exercise independent thought,
analyze outcomes, and think logically and deductively.
66
They can engage in pure thought independent of actions
they see or perform. They can hypothesize and draw de-
ductions, understand theories, and combine them to
solve problems ...In Piagetian theory, by the age of
fifteen, a child's thinking has evolved into a mature
state and adult thought exists within the child's reper-
toire of mental functions.
67
Another prominent researcher, Lawrence Kohlberg, in a
somewhat different approach, determined maturity by focusing
on "moral development" because those children who have
reached a "higher [stage] of moral development [tend to be
those who] are . . . better able to place a moral problem within
63 Richard E. Redding, Children's Competence to Provide Informed Consent for
Mental Health Treatment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 695, 728 (1993) (citing FRANK-
LINE. ZIMRING, THE CHANGiNG LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 103-04 (1982)).64 See Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's
Capacity to Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1873, 1878-79 (1996) (citing Jean Piaget,
Psychology and Epistemology 5-7 (Arnold Rosin trans., 1971)).
65 See id. (stating Piaget's belief that learning occurs through the possession of
stages).
66 See id. at 1879 (explaining the learning capabilities of children between the
ages of 11 and 15).
67 Id.
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the context of the 'bigger picture."' 68 Kohlberg concluded that
this ability to think morally usually occurs around age thirteen
or fourteen. 69 However, although they studied two different in-
dicia of maturation, both Piaget and Kohlberg concluded that
children over thirteen or fourteen are as capable as adults of
formal logical thought.
Several studies completed in the 1970s and 1980s agreed.
They specifically focused on cognitive development in terms of
adolescent competency to make decisions, such as informed
consent, and found that "adolescents do not substantially differ
from adults in their ability to understand and reason about
medical treatment alternatives."70 In one 1982 study, the deci-
sion-making of different age groups - nine-year-olds, fourteen-
year-olds, and twenty-one-year-olds - were tested with regard
to a hypothetical illness and proposed medical treatment. Their
understanding of facts, treatment outcomes, choices to be made,
and decision-making processes were studied. While the nine-
year-olds were a bit more conservative because they chose inpa-
tient care more often, the fourteen-year-olds and twenty-one-
year-olds achieved the same results.71
In another study, where children were asked to give health
advice to their peers, twelve-year-olds were determined to be as
competent as nineteen-year-olds. 2 Indeed, when videotapes
68 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 13, at 1786.
69 See JOHN W. SANTROCK, ADOLESCENCE 407 (7 th ed., 1998). Kohlberg's re-
search was based on three levels of development. The first level acts in order to avoid
punishment or get rewards. Those in the second level try to maintain social order, and
have a sense of morality, but are unable to think formal logical thoughts. See also
Scarnecchia & Field, supra note 61, at 93-97. Young women also make moral deci-
sions differently from men. See id. at 97. Women choose what will cause the most
good and the least amount of harm. See id. (citing Kelly Flood, Decision for Abortion
Is Moral: Women's Choices Often Based on Responsibilities, LEXINGTON HERALD
LEADER, Mar. 15, 1992, Special Section, at 9). Men make moral decisions based on
clearly defined ideas of what is right or wrong. See id.
70 O'Shaughnessy, supra note 35, at 1753. One study determined that the ability
to focus on relevant information occurs between the ages of ten and thirteen. See id.
(citing Michael C. Roberts et al., Children's Perceptions of Medical and Psychologi-
cal Disorders in Their Peers, 10 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 76 (1981)). Thus, chil-
dren under twelve may use less information than adults in making decisions, but chil-
dren fifteen or older nevertheless systematically make decisions in the same way as
adults.
71 See Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 13, at 1769 (explaining a study of
adolescents' health care decisions and choices).
72 id.
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were shown to fifteen-year-olds, they were as competent as
twenty-one-year-olds in identifying when patients' rights had
been violated. 73 Thirteen-year-old women have also been found
to be as competent in their decision-making as twenty-one-year-
old women when faced with an unplanned pregnancy. 74 This
latter study noted that minors could "reason abstractly about
hypothetical situations, reason about multiple alternatives and
consequences, consider multiple variables, combine variables in
more complex ways, and use information systematically. 75
Thus, in order to be able to give informed consent to medi-
cal treatment, minors must be competent to understand the na-
ture, extent, and probable outcome of the treatment.76 They
must be able to understand the information provided, reach a
reasonable outcome, and rationally make and voluntarily reach
a decision.77 However, it would appear that minors as young as
thirteen or fourteen are generally capable of informed consent
to treatment.
Critics of these studies, on the other hand, claim they over-
look psycho-social factors, 78 such as peer influence, which can
73 See Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 13, at 1769.
74 See id. at 1770 (citing Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental
Trends in Adolescents' Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion,
16 LAW& HUM. BEHAv. 129, 134, 135, 140-41 (1992)).
75 Mlyniec, supra note 64, at 1882 (quoting Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport,
Developmental Trends in Adolescents' Psychological and Legal Competence to Con-
sent to Abortion, 16 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 129, 147-48 (1992)).
76 See Rosato, supra note 36 at 21, (citing Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of
Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330, 337 (Kan. 1970).
77 See generally Joan-Margaret Kun, Rejecting the Adage "Children Should be
Seen and Not Heard"-The Mature Minor Doctrine, 16 PACE L. REv. 423, 453 (1996)
(discussing the rights of minors to refuse life-sustaining treatment) (citing Thomas
Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspec-
tive, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412, 416-21 (1978)). See also Redding, supra note 63, at 704-
07 (discussing a child's capacity to understand and the ability to consent). Medical
professionals also have a similar standard for competency which includes the follow-
ing: factual understanding of the problem, implications of the treatment and treatment
alternatives, rational decision-making, the capability of communicating a choice,
reasonableness of choice and general competency. To determine whether a patient
has decision-making capacity, the physician determines whether the patient has rea-
soning ability, understanding, voluntariness, and understands the nature of the deci-
sion to be made. See generally Hawkins, supra note 10, at 2127-28 (citing Nancy
M.P. King & Alan W. Cross, Children as Decision Makers: Guidelines for Pediatri-
cians, 115 J. PEDIATRICS 10, 12 (1989).
78 See Rosato, supra note 36 (citing Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning
in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37 VHiL. L. REv. 1607, 1624 (1992). See also Cauff-
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make a minor act in an immature manner even though she oth-
erwise possesses the required cognitive skills and maturity to
give informed consent. 79 It has also been determined that priori-
ties and attitudes, for purposes relevant to making judgments,
differ between adults and children. Most adolescents are more
concerned with short-term consequences, whereas adults are
concerned with long-term impacts, and adolescents are more
likely to be risk-takers and believe they are invulnerable to
harm.81 "This sense of invulnerability has been cited not only to
explain risky behavior, but also as a basis for legal precedents
maintaining that minors are incapable of making rational deci-
sions regarding their own well-being, especially regarding is-
sues of health. 82
No empirical evidence, however, supports the view that
psychosocial factors directly affect individual medical decision-
making. 83 Indeed, recent cognitive development studies have
recognized that children over age fourteen can make mature and
intelligent decisions about health care.84 The American Acad-
emy of Pediatrics' Committee on Bio-ethics has not only sup-
ported the finding that children "achieve decisional capacity at
[a] much earlier [age] than is recognized legally," 85 but based
upon what we now understand to be the adolescent's level of
maturity and cognitive abilities, it recommends that adolescents
should be more involved than at present in health care decision-
making. 86
man & Steinberg, supra note 13 (citing Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adoles-
cent Decisionmaking in Legal Contexts, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 221,222 (1995)).
79 See Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 13, at 1773.
80 See id. at 1772-73 (determining what factors differentiate adolescent from
adult decision-making).
81 See id. at 1767.
82 Id. (citing Daniel K. Lapsley & Michael N. Murphy, Another Look at the
Theoretical Assumptions of Adolescent Egocentrism, 5 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 201,
214 (1985)).83 See id. at 1788 (cautioning reliance on any connections between traits and
mature judgment as authoritative, without studies).
84 See Jessica Berg, How Much Input Should a Child Have About His Treat-
ment? AM. MED. NEWS, June 1, 1998, at 11 (urging physicians to encourage minors
to take an interested role as a participant in their own medical care even where the
law is not so flexible).
85 MIDWEST BIOETHICS CENTER, HEALTH CARE TREATMENT DECISION MAKING
GUIDELINES FOR MINORS 3 (1994-95).
86 See Committee on Bioethics, American Academy of Pediatrics, Informed
Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314,
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IV. THE JUDICIAL VIEW OF MATURITY
When courts have spoken on this subject of children's ma-
turity, it has usually not been in the context of consent to cus-
tomary and ordinary medical procedures, but in cases asserting
privacy or freedom of religion and the constitutional rights of
minors. Notwithstanding the psychological studies, the courts in
cases raising constitutional claims presume that the state has
parens patriae authority over a minor until he is proven mature
enough and competent to give informed consent. 87 More prob-
lematic is the fact that the Supreme Court has seemed reluctant
to provide guidance in determining maturity when minors de-
mand constitutional rights.88 In Bellotti 1,89 which raised the
question of whether a minor needed parental consent to obtain
an abortion, Justice Powell wrote that "[n]ot only is it difficult
to define, let alone determine, maturity, but also the fact that a
minor may be very much an adult in some respects does not
mean that his or her need and opportunity for growth under pa-
rental guidance and discipline have ended.""
Nevertheless, in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth,91 the Court held that a minor does not need parental
consent if "she is sufficiently mature to understand the proce-
dure and to make an intelligent assessment of her circum-
316-17 (1995) (urging physicians in certain circumstances to encourage and gain
participation and assent of minors with respect to their health care). But cf. supra note
44 and accompanying text (explaining presumptions about parental authority's bene-
fits). Studies have found that health professionals, who see children most often in
medical settings, believe children are capable of making medical decisions at 10.3
years of age. See Shield & Baum, supra note 1, at 1183 (citing PRISCILLA ALDERSON,
CHILDREN'S CONSENT TO SURGERY 9 (1993)). Parents view them as capable at age
13.9 years. See id. Children, themselves, only believe they are competent to make
health care decisions at age fourteen. See id.
17 See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327-28 (1ll. 1989) (discussing the necessary
balancing between a state's parens patriae authority and a minor's competence and
maturity).
88 See Scarnecchia & Field, supra note 61, at 79-80.
89 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
90 See Scarnecchia & Field, supra note 61, at 77-78 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 643-44 n.23 (1979) [Bellotti HI] (a state must have a judicial bypass proce-
dure established if it requires parental consent for abortion)). In Bellotti, Justice Pow-
ell was addressing the age limits established for marriage, in which the risk to the
minor's health is low if the minor has to wait to get married, as compared to the ur-
gency to determine whether the minor is mature when the issue of abortion is in-
volved. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642.
"' 428 U.S. 52,53 (1976).
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stances." 92 Competence must now be determined by trial judges
based upon the context or situation.93 Therefore, in applying the
"mature minor" doctrine, courts use a "multi-factor analysis" to
determine whether minors properly consented to medical treat-
ment.94 These factors include age, degree of maturity, the nature
of the treatment, whether a parent agrees with the treatment, and
whether the benefit is for the minor rather than a third party. 95
A. Age
It is easy to tell when and individual is eighteen; it is
hard to know when an individual is mature.
96
Courts seldom allow minors under the age of sixteen to
make decisions regarding their treatment. 97 Indeed, no court has
ever ranted a patient younger than fourteen the right to con-
sent. "Some courts have recognized the 'rule of sevens,' which
derives from English common law[,]" 99 and under which: chil-
dren under seven have no capacity to consent; children age
seven to fourteen are presumed not to have the capacity to con-
92 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1376 (1974) (citing
Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330, 337 (Kan. 1970)).
93 See Rosato, supra note 36, at 51-52 (defining the requisite competence for
decision-making regarding life-saving treatment); Michael J. Saks, Social Psycho-
logical Perspectives on the Problem of Consent, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO
CONSENT 41, 50 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983); Donald N. Bersoff, Children as
Participants in Psychoeducational Assessment, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CON-
SENT 149, 151, 174 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983); Loir A. Weithorn, Involving
Children in Decisions Affecting Their Own Welfare: Guidelines for Professionals, in
CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 235, 242 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983).
Minors have been determined to be mature enough to make decisions regarding abor-
tion, Miranda rights, medical treatments, and political expression. See notes 29-35,
50 and accompanying text.
94 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (discussing state law requiring parental consent for
minors' abortions).
95 See O'Connor, supra note 54, at 27, 38.
96 Willard Gaylin, The Competence of Children: No Longer All or None, HAST-
INGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1982, at 33.
97 See Nancy Batterman, Under Age: A Minor's Right to Consent to Health
Care, 10 TouRo L. REv. 637, 672 (1994) (citing Tania E. Wright, A Minor's Right to
Consent to Medical Care, 25 How. L.J. 525, 532 (1982)).
98 See O'Connor, supra note 54, at 27. See, e.g., Zoski v. Gaines, 260 N.W. 99,
103 (Mich. 1935). (holding that a nine-year-old was too young to give consent for a
tonsillectomy).
99 O'Connor, supra note 54, at 27.
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sent; and children age fourteen and above are presumed to have
capacity to consent.
Courts have used this rule to support a presumption that
a teenager older than fourteen has the capacity to give
informed consent to medical treatment. This distinction
is based on the recognition that reasoning ability is usu-
ally present by this age. Evidence that formal opera-
tional thought emerges at approximately age 12 pro-
vides some scientific support for this legal rule.
10 1
B. Indicia of Maturity
Courts use various means of determining maturity and thus
competence sufficient to give informed consent. There are no
specific rules for determining maturity; children may show
competence through conduct ranging from testifying for them-
selves in court to successfully exercising the responsibility for
signing checks.102 The guidelines for maturity emerge on a case-
by-case basis.103
In one decision, a court determined that a minor was ma-
ture enough to consent to treatment where she had good grades,
was planning to go to college the next year, and had been given
a blank check from her parents to pay for the office visit.1°4 Yet
in another case, a seventeen-year-old minor was found imma-
ture even though she worked twenty-five to thirty hours a week,
10o See id. (citing Lacey v. Laird, 139 N.E.2d 25, 33 (Ohio 1956) (discussing the
"rule of sevens" with respect to criminal law and finding that criminal immunity ends
when a child turns fourteen). See also Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 745
(Tenn. 1987) (using the "rule of sevens" in the application of a minor's right to con-
sent to medical treatment).
101 Id. (citing BARBEL INHELDER & JEAN PIAGET, THE GROwTH OF LOGICAL
THINKING: FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE 334-50 (Anne Parsons & Stanley
Milgram trans., 1958)).
l02 See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 325-27 (Ill. 1989) (recounting a variety of
means courts have used to determine maturity of children to consent to health care);
Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 743.
103 Some of the court's measurements have included the following: In re Seiferth,
127 N.E.2d 820 (N.Y. 1955) (finding that a minor had "convictions of his own");
Bach v. Long Island Jewish Hosp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 289, 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966)
(holding that a minor had "reached the age of discretion"); and In re E.G., 549 N.E.
2d at 327-28 (finding a minor competent to refuse treatment based on her individual
circumstances).
104 See also Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 743 (giving characteristics that may qualify
the plaintiff to consent to treatment). See also note 5 supra.
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had good grades, was involved in sports, and paid her own car
and phone expenses. In the latter case, the minor had become
pregnant a second time and was seeking an abortion. The court
held that she lacked competency and maturity.10 5 Some cases
are more clear-cut, such as where a court determined that a
child who depends on his parent's advice, has never been away
from home, admits he is still a child, and has never dated, was
not mature. 
106
Minors must show "proof of [their] maturity by clear and
convincing evidence."10 7 Whether the minor is mature enough to
make medical decisions is a question of fact, to be determined
by ascertaining whether the child has the ability to understand
the risks, consequences, and nature of treatment.108 This may be
assessed by examining: "1) the evidencing of choice, 2) the rea-
sonable outcome of choice, 3) the choice based on rational rea-
sons, 4) the ability to understand the implications of the choice,
and 5) the actual understanding of the choice."'1 9 Some jurisdic-
tions hold that the more serious the decision, the greater the ca-
pacity required in the decision-maker. 110
C. Balancing Levels of Maturity Against the Nature of
Treatment
Courts generally find children competent to consent to or
refuse treatment that has little risk, such as for back pain,1' ton-
sillectomies,112 vaccinations,113 skin grafts,1 4 and cosmetic sur-
105 In re Jane Doe, 566 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (Ohio 1990) (stating that a child did
not have the requisite maturity to decide to have an abortion). Justice Brown noted in
dissent: "If she is not a 'mature minor,' then who is?" Id. at 1189.
106 In re Long Island Jewish Med. Center, 147 Misc. 2d 724, 727, 730 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1990) (examining whether a patient seven weeks short of his 18th birthday consti-
tuted a mature minor). See also O.G., P.G. & M.G. v. Baum, 790 S.W.2d 839, 842
(Tex. Ct. App. 1990) highlighting the fact that a minor's testimony was not presented
to the trial court as a significant factor in the court's determination of maturity).
107 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 327.
'O See Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 749.
109 Kroft, supra note 17, at 460.
110 See id. See also Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (holding that con-
finement of a disoriented patient in psychiatric hospital without hearing to determine
capacity to consent infringed upon the patient's liberty interests); Fuller v. Starnes,
597 S.W.2d 88 (1980) (holding that a physician's duty to disclose risks is measured
by the customary practice of physicians in the community in which he practices).
... See Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 739.
112 See Bishop v. Shurly, 211 N.W. 75, 78 (Mich. 1926) (finding a 19-year-old
competent consent to local anesthesia prior to his tonsillectomy).
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gery.115 However, ethicists agree that the ordinary indicia of
competence should be balanced against the risks of treatment;
16
as the risk increases, there must be greater evidence of maturity.
Therefore, where a "mature minor" seeks major medical inter-
vention,1 1 7 or seeks to refuse life-sustaining treatment without
prior parental consent, a court order should be sought. The court
will require a heightened standard of proof of competence." 8 In
addition, while children may not need parental consent to do-
nate blood to be used by third parties, they will need parental
consent for non-therapeutic treatment that benefits a third party.
Thus, minors cannot consent to donating a kidney,1 9 or to al-
lowing a skin graft which benefits someone other than the mi-
nor. ° The treatment must benefit the child and not be for the
sole benefit of others. 121
"' See Gulf& S.I.R. Co. v. Sullivan, 119 So. 501, 502 (Miss. 1928) (confirming
the general rule that a child who is capable of understanding and appreciating the
consequences of a medical invasion can consent thereto).
"4 See, e.g., Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330
(Kan. 1970) (holding that a seventeen-year-old female was capable of providing con-
sent for a minor surgical procedure entailing a skin graft to repair her finger).
11 See Lacey v. Laird, 139 N.E.2d 25 (Ohio 1956) (discussing parental versus
minor consent to plastic surgery); Johnston v. Wellesley Hosp. 17 D.L.R.3d 139
(1970) (finding that a twenty-year-old could give consent for a procedure to remove
acne scars).
116 O'Connor, supra note 54, at 27 (citing William Gaylin, The Competence of
Children: No LongerAll or None, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1982, at 33, 35-38).
117 See O'Connor, supra note 54, at 38.
18 See In re E.G. 549 N.E.2d 322, 327-28 (Ill. 1989); see, e.g., In re Swan, 569
A.2d 1202, 1206 (Me. 1990) (respecting a minor's decision not to be kept on life-
sustaining equipment because it was shown that the minor expressed these wishes in
two previous serious conversations); see also In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633, 639-
40 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (requiring a best interests standard, rather than a substituted
judgment standard in the context of terminating life support for a minor child because
the minor was never competent in the first place and, therefore, one cannot determine
what choice the child would have made if competent).
119 O'Connor, supra note 53, at 38.
120 See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (holding as improper a
lower court's jury instruction which failed to instruct that without parental consent a
15-year-old could not get a skin graft to benefit a third party).
121 See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 33, at 157.
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V. THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE
"MATURE MINOR" DOCTRINE
Controversy regarding the "mature minor" doctrine does
not center upon the justification for the rule itself, but upon its
application.
The law provides little real guidance to the judge and
his decision must necessarily reflect personal and socie-
tal values and mores whose enforcement upon the minor
- particularly when contrary to her own informed and
reasonable decision - is fundamentally at odds with pri-
vacy interests underlying the constitutional protection
afforded to her decision.
12
Trial judges exercise discretion in determining when a minor is
mature, and do not have to articulate how they ascertained that
fact. 123 Making matters worse, "[n]othing in law school and lit-
tle in an average judge's experience provide a meaningful
framework for making such a decision [regarding whether the
minor is mature].' 24
Therefore, because each judge will tend to have her own
opinion as to whether a child is mature, critics argue, applica-
tions of the doctrine have been inconsistent, 125 and thus unfair.
Indeed, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Souter has suggested that
judges should disqualify themselves where they may not be able
to separate their own morals from the choices the teenager must
make.
126
1z2 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 655-56 (1979) [Bellotti I1] (Stevens, J., con-
curring)).
123 See Mlyniec, supra note 64, at 1889 (discussing ascertainment of maturity in
abortion cases).124 Scarnecchia & Field, supra note 61, at 76. Recent studies have reinforced this
point. When judges and attorneys were asked to identify mature adolescents from a
group of 477 teenagers, judges found nine mature children, while the attorneys de-
termined that there were eleven. Only one teenager was chosen more than once, and
the judges and attorneys did not choose the same teens. See id. at 81 (citing Susan
Yates & Anita J. Pliner, Judging Maturity in the Courts: The Massachusetts Consent
Statute, 78 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 646, 647 (1988)).
125 See Scarnecchia & Field, supra note 61, at 77-80.
126 See Scarnecchia & Field, supra note 61, at 85 (citing John Milne, Souter Note
Helped Sink '81 N.H. Bill on Abortion, BOSTON GLOBE, July 26, 1990, at 1, 3) (refer-
encing a letter written by Justice Souter while serving on the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court).
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The "mature minor" doctrine has been consistently applied,
however, in cases in which the minor (1) is near the age of ma-
jority, usually fifteen years or older, (2) displays the capacity to
understand the nature and risks of the treatment, and (3) where
the nature of the treatment is not "serious." Indeed, no court has
rejected the doctrine itself since 1941,127 and no doctor has been
held liable for battery in the past thirty years when treating a
patient over age fourteen without parental consent. 128 Courts
will protect physicians in their "non-negligent treatment of...
mature minor[s] who consent ... to a procedure after discussion
with the physician."
129
VI. STATUTES MAY ALSO INDEPENDENTLY
GRANT CHILDREN THE RIGHT TO CONSENT TO
TREATMENT
In most states, the "mature minor" doctrine is a matter of
common law. In a few states, such as Arkansas and Mississippi,
the doctrine has been adopted by statute, but most legislatures
have chosen to not do so because of the "subjective nature" of
its application.' 3
0
In all states, however, there are statutes that give doctors
authority to treat minors, regardless of parental consent, to
"prevent certain negative consequences resulting from lack of
medical care, such as significant harm to the child or to the
community."''1 These statutes offer guidelines to the medical
community not always apparent in vague judicial rulings.132
"Through these exceptions, the states recognize that minors do
not have to reach the statutory age of majority to make their
127 See O'Connor, supra note 54, at 26.
128 "As of 1986, there appears not to have been a single reported case where a
physician has been held liable for treating a minor without informed consent." Red-
ding supra note 63, at 744.
129 O'Connor, supra note 54, at 27.
130 Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Medical Practitioner's Liability for Treat-
ment Given Child Without Parent's Consent, 67 A.L.R. 4 th 511,517 (1989).
13l Rosato, supra note 36, at 26 (citing Abigail English, Adolescent Health Care:
Barriers to Access, Consent, Confidentiality and Payment, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
481,484 (1986)).
132 See Hawkins, supra note 10, at 2101 (noting the important role of legislators
and courts in improving minors' rights to participate in health care decisions).
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own medical decisions," 133 and more importantly, that many
minors would rather not receive any medical care than consult
their parents about certain forms of treatment. 13 4 In addition to
existing "mature minor" provisions, there are three general
categories of statutory exceptions to the requirement of parental
consent: for medical emergencies, certain unique legal or medi-
cal status, and specific medical conditions.
135
A. Emergencies
Physicians need not obtain consent to treat minors during
medical emergencies.136 A medical emergency exists where (1)
the patient is incapacitated to the point that she cannot use her
mental facilities to reach an informed choice; (2) the circum-
stances are life-threatening or serious enough that immediate
treatment is required; and (3) it would be medically imprudent
to attempt to solicit consent from some other authorized person
on behalf of the patient. 137 In other cases, obtaining parental
consent may not be feasible or might be very harmful to the mi-
nor, especially if sexual assault or abuse is involved. Therefore,
physicians may treat minors if, "in [their] sole opinion, the ob-
taining of consent is not reasonable."'
138
133 Rosato, supra note 36, at 26 (citing In re E.G., 594 N.E.2d 322, 327-28 (Ill.
1989)). These exceptions, however, were not intended to protect the minors' rights to
self-determination. Id.
134 See Batterman, supra note 97, at 640 (stating that "[tihe legislature has de-
termined either that the condition is too damaging to society as a whole to remain
untreated or that the treatment is harmless enough to the minor to warrant its applica-
tion without parental consent") (citations omitted).
135 Rosato, supra note 36, at 25 (discussing exceptions to the parental consent
requirement) (citations omitted).
136 See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/3(a) (West 1997) (mandating specific
situations where consent procedures may be lifted when treating minors); Rosato,
supra note 36, at 19 (citations omitted).
137 See Kroft, supra note 17, at 465 (analyzing the exception to the requirement
of informed consent). See, e.g., Stafford v. Louisiana State Univ., 448 So.2d 852 (La.
Ct. App. 1984) (holding that since conservative treatment had been rendered and
good faith efforts were made to reach the patient's next of kin, the physicians were
justified in proceeding on the basis of a medical emergency). Permission is implied
because it is assumed that parents would consent if they knew of the situation. See
Kroft, supra note 17, at 468 (citing Nancy Batterman, Under Age: A Minor's Rights
to Consent to Health Care, 10 TouRo L. REv. 637 (1994)).
"8 See 410 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. Act 210/0.01 et seq. (West 1997) (mandating
situations where a physician may treat a minor without parental consent).
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B. Special Status of the Minor
The "emancipated minor" doctrine1 39 gives minors the right
to consent to treatment if they are married, pregnant, or are par-
ents to a child and the court has issued an order giving the mi-
nor the right to consent. 140 "[T]he legislature has decided that
[these circumstances, as well as] joining the armed forces [or]
turning eighteen [constitute] an act of physical, psychological or
economic separation from one's parents."' 41 Thus, the doctrine
is intended to protect minors who are no longer dependent on
their parents, those whose "parents [have] relinquished control
over their child's behavior and personal affairs. ' 42
However, the courts have emphasized that while minors
emancipated under this doctrine are being given control over
certain personal rights, they may still be allowed to depend on
parents for certain other property rights.1 43 "Medically emanci-
pated" minors, for example, whose situation is discussed in the
next section, may still "retain their own wages, sue their parents
for injuries that result from parent's negligence, establish their
own domicile, and receive public assistance," even though they
cannot sign leases, or sell or control property.144
C. Specific Medical Conditions
Consent by minors to treatment for mental illness, abortion,
contraception, sexually transmitted diseases, and drug and alco-
hol abuse are often treated differently than routine medical mat-
ters. A minor can voluntarily admit herself to a mental health
center if she is sixteen years or older. 45 In most states, pregnant
139 For a discussion of the "emancipated minor" exception, see generally Smith
v. Seibly, 431 P.2d 719, 723 (Wash. 1967) (cited in Batterman, supra note 97, at
661).
140 However, if the parents, guardians, or the child object to the classification, the
court cannot grant the order. 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 30/9 (West 1999).
141 Batterman, supra note 97, at 637.
142 Id. (citing JAMES M. MORRISSEY ET AL, CONSENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN
THE HEALTH CARE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLEScENTS: A LEGAL GUIDE 33, 33-35
(1986)).
143 See id. (discussing minor's emancipation from parental control).
144 Id. at 647-48 (citations omitted).
,4' See, e.g., 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3 -502 (West 1997) (mandating
voluntary admission for minors 16 years or older to mental health facilities). Minors
16 years of age or older can admit themselves to a mental health facility by filling out
an application. However, in the case of community service areas with a participating
mental health center, no minor shall be admitted to a state-run hospital without the
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minors may seek abortions without parental consent. In states in
which parental consent is mandatory, the state must provide an
expeditious "judicial bypass" through which minors may prove
their maturity to a judge and be granted an absolute right to
consent.
146
In twenty-three states, minors can get birth control medica-
tion without parental consent. 147 In Illinois, however, a minor
can obtain this medication only if married, a parent, or there is
parental consent. 148 The minor can also receive birth control
medication if a serious health hazard would result if she did not
receive treatment, or if a clergy-person or planned parenthood
agency referred the minor for treatment.
149
Forty-nine states allow minors who are twelve years old or
older to receive treatment for sexually transmitted diseases
without parental consent. 150 Some states even allow treatment
for any infectious, communicable, or contagious disease.
151
Similarly, in order to promote cessation of drug and alcohol
abuse, minors who are twelve years old or older can request
outpatient counseling without parental consent.152 Minors can
also seek counseling if a family member is a drug or alcohol
abuser.
153
recommendation of a qualified certifier. See id. See also 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/3 - 504 (West 1997) (stating that a parent, guardian, or interested person can admit
a minor to a private health center without the minor's consent for emergency treat-
ment).
146 Rosato, supra note 36, at 16 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647-48
(1979)). See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899-900 (1992) (show-
ing that, ironically, for minors who choose to carry their child to full term, only
twenty-seven states give prenatal care and delivery services without parental con-
sent).
147 See Deborah L. Shelton, Rights of Passage, AM. MED. NEWS, June 17, 1996,
at 13 (discussing whether confidential health services improve care provided to ado-
lescents).
148 See 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/1 (West 1993) (mandating requirements
for minors receiving birth control).
149 See id.
150 See Shelton, supra note 147.
151 See Rosato, supra note 36, at 29-30 n.109 (citing Ala. Code § 22-8-6 (West
1994); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6926(a) (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 710
(1999)).152 See id. at 31 (citing statutes that eliminate the need for parental consent for
the treatment of drug or alcohol abuse) (citations omitted).
153 Id.
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D. Confidentiality
Confidentiality is especially important to an adolescent;
many teenagers would not get treatment if they knew that their
parents would be notified. 154 In most states, statutes require
physicians to maintain the confidences of patients or be liable
for their negligent or willful failures to do so. 155 A doctor is
only permitted to release information to the person who has the
ability to consent to treatment.156 However, in order to balance
society's interests and patient's privacy rights, legislatures have
adopted exceptions requiring a physician to notify a third party.
Certain infectious diseases must be reported to public offi-
cials, and if a minor is diagnosed with HIV in some states, the
physician must notify the Department of Health.' 57 The Depart-
ment of Health will then notify the school principal, who must
tell the Superintendent, and may tell classroom teachers, school
nurses, or others who work with the minor in educational set-
tings.158 Health care officials must also try to persuade the child
to notify his or her parents. If the child does not, the officials
must make a "reasonable effort" to notify the parents if they
determine that it is in the "best interests" of the child to do so. 
9
Physicians who treat victims of child abuse must notify the
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). 160 If the
minor is a victim of crime, the physician must notify the po-
lice.t 61 The physician also has a duty to warn third parties if she
knows the minor may pose a threat to them.162 If the minor is
154 Id.
"' See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/45 (West 1998) (mandating strict patient
confidentiality for physicians except in certain enumerated situations).
156 See Patricia Booth Levenberg, Ensuring Confidentiality in Treating Teens, 39
AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 7, 1996, at 18 (discussing the practical and legal issues sur-
rounding confidentiality of adolescents' medical treatment).
117 See 410 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 315/2a (West 1997).
158 See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/4 (West 1997) (mandating reporting of
sexually transmitted diseases).
158 Id.
151 See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/9k (West 1997).
160 See 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4 (West 1993).
161 See 325 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/ 1.la (West 1999).
162 See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 17 Cal.3d 425 (1976)
(holding, in a landmark decision, that a doctor may be liable for breach of duty for
failing to warn a third party concerning threats made by his patient).
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admitted to a mental hospital, the physician must notify the par-
ents upon admittance. 1
63
However, physicians have a choice as to whether parents
should be notified regarding venereal diseases. 164 They should
make an effort to tell parents only if it will not impair the treat-
ment. 65 On the other hand, physicians who treat minors for
drug or alcohol treatment cannot tell the parents unless "neces-
sary to protect the safety of the minor, a family member, or an-
other individual."' 166 If necessary, the director of the medical
facility will notify the parents, and notify the minor of the noti-
fication.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Let us not as a society limit unnecessarily the freedom
of our children to develop and exercise their decision-
making capabilities, to obtain needed treatment in con-
fidentiality and to refuse treatment when it may be
harmful to their personhood and individuality. 167
Experts on children's development have agreed that their
cognitive abilities, and thus their decision-making competence,
mature arguably by thirteen, and certainly by age fifteen. 168 Yet
regardless of their actual maturity, when minors' medical deci-
sions are challenged in court, there must be "clear and convinc-
ing evidence" of their competence to consent. 169 This burden of
proof is made more difficult by the fact that judges are not ordi-
narily familiar with children's cognitive development. Children
also suffer the uncertainty that flows from reliance upon judges'
unique "moral constitution" for vindication of their right to en-
gage in medical decision-making. 70
163 See 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-502 (West 1997) (mandating that any
minor may be admitted to a health care facility following the application of a parent).
164 See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/4, 210/5 (West 1997) (providing consent
rules for physicians treating minors with venereal diseases or alcohol and drug is-
sues).
165 See id.
166 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/5 (West 1997).
167 Redding, supra note 63, at 751.
168 See generally supra notes 52-61, and accompanying text (explaining legal
development of the mature minor doctrine).
169 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327-28 (Ill. 1989).
170 See also Scamecchia & Field, supra note 61, at n.102.
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Even though the Supreme Court has provided minors certain
limited rights to consent to abortions, 17 that Court and most
legislatures are unwilling to expand children's rights to consent
to medical procedures which are less invasive and morally an-
guishing. 72 Nonetheless, "[i]f a minor has the right to choose to
undergo such an invasive procedure as an abortion, then cer-
tainly she should have the right to refuse or accept other forms
of medical treatment." 173 This is crucial to children's ability to
protect their privacy, bodily integrity, and self-determination. 174
Therefore, children seeking medical treatment should certainly
be presumed by physicians and courts to be mature at age fif-
teen. 175 Legislatures should also consider codifying the "mature
minor" doctrine so the common law guidelines would be made
clear and physicians would understand their specific authority
under this doctrine. 1
76
In the meantime, doctors should not be apprehensive about
treating minors so long as they (1) take reasonable care to de-
termine "maturity," and (2) communicate in an appropriate
way 177 before obtaining consent. The physician should (1) in-
171 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (explaining the problem with
judicial granting of rights to minors independent of parents).
172 But see Hawkins, supra note 10, at 2100 (citing In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d 286,
290 (Ill. App. 1987)) (predicting that the Supreme Court will expand the privacy
rights of minors beyond procreation issues). See also Rosato, supra note 36, at 16
(citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) for the proposition that deference
to minor's abortion rights is justified because of the time limit and the irreversibility
of the decision).
173 Hawkins, supra note 10, at 2077. There are those, however, who would return
all medical decision-making power to parents regardless of the minor's maturity,
status, the nature of the treatment, or the "best interests" of the child. But see Shelton,
supra note 147, at 13, 15 (discussing Congress' efforts to return all medical decision-
making power to the minor's parents).
174 See generally Hawkins, supra note 10, at 2093 (noting the growth in chil-
dren's constitutional rights); see also Hillary Rodham Clinton, Children Under the
Law, 43 HARV. EDUC. REv. 487, 509 (1973) (outlining the extension of the Four-
teenth Amendment procedural rights to children).
175 They can often reasonably be found to be competent by physicians after thir-
teen. See Rosato, supra note 36, at 16-17. Minors who go to court to bypass parental
consent certainly should be considered mature. But see Cauffman & Steinberg, supra
note 13, at 1763-65 (discussing the limits of society's recognition of an adolescent's
competency); see generally Hawkins, supra note 10, at 2100-01 (demonstrating a
growing trend by legislatures, courts, and medical professionals of giving minors
greater decision-making authority).
176 See O'Connor, supra note 54, at 38.
177 "The problems associated with doctor to minor communication have not been
effectively addressed... in the most common interaction, basic pediatric care... "
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form the child about the medical necessity, the treatment op-
tions, and the risks in a comprehensible fashion, and (2) write
notes in the minor's file about the discussion.' 78 Maturity or
competence may then be assessed by examining for evidence:
(1) that a choice is being made, (2) that the minor understands
that a choice is being made, (3) that the choice is one with a
reasonable outcome, (4) that the choice had a rational basis, and
(5) that the minor understands the implications of the choice. 179
Physicians, therefore, must always engage in an individual-
ized evaluation of competency through brief, careful conversa-
tions. Because minors view risks differently than adults, risks
should be discussed in a manner likely to raise concern about
those risks in children. 180 Additional time may also have to be
taken to explain difficult medical concepts or treatments in
terms that minors can understand. 181 Children should also be
given an adequate amount of time to make a decision and
should not feel pressured by the physician to do so.1
82
The doctor, however, is only required to determine whether
the child is mature enough to make a decision regarding treat-
ment, not whether she is mature in all aspects of the her life.
183
If the child is judged to have a mature understanding of treat-
ment, is close to the age of maturity (older than fourteen), and
the treatment is not high risk or for another's benefit, parental
consent should not be needed.
Popper, supra note 15, at 819 n.1. For a reasonable approach, see Appendix A, infra,
at 173, which provides examples of questions physicians should ask when determin-
ing comprehension and maturity.
178 Physicians should write notes in minors' files about informed consent discus-
sions. See Peter Moore, When Must Consent be Written?, PULSE, Aug. 23, 1997, at
64, 65. A written form signed by the minor should be considered, especially if treat-
ment carries the risk of a lawsuit. Id. If the minor were to testify, for example, that
the only reason she allowed treatment was because it was the only option the doctor
discussed, her consent would not be voluntary and informed, even if she were "ma-
ture." See Mlyniec, supra note 64, at 1907 (citing Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling,
Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412
(1978)).
179 See supra note 106.
180 See Mlyniec, supra note 64, at 1907 (recommending that the court require an
informed consent dialogue to determine whether the child's preference or waiver is
valid).
181 See Berg, supra note 84.
182 See Moore, supra note 178, at 65.
183 See Scamecchia & Field, supra note 61, at 85-86.
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Presently, if there is parental consent, there is no need to
explain to children what will happen to them.184 But the public
policies that justify the "mature minor" doctrine require a trust-
ing relationship between children and physicians. 85 Trusting
relationships do not develop unless children's' right to be in-
formed of and participate in treatment decisions that effect them
have been respected.l16 However,
[although the] United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child (Convention) mandates that "due weight" should be given
"to the views of the child according to age and maturity" ... [,in
practice] "few children are asked if they "agree to having a
blood test, or to being given a drug, or to having an opera-
tion." 18
7
Consequently, a foundation for children's trust in treatment
must be built when they are young.188 Children can be informed
of treatment choices, and be part of the collective decision-
making concerning their medical treatment, as early as age
eleven. 18
9
Even though they may be incapable of making medical
treatment decisions, minors should still be included in decision-
making and be allowed to voice their concerns because "it is the
184 See Powers v. Floyd, 904 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that
a doctor who performed an abortion on a minor without the minor's knowledge was
not liable because the doctor had parental consent and providing the information to
the minor could have been disturbing).
185 "Aside from [questions of] liability, there is [a] premise that the rate and qual-
ity of healing and recovery is higher with informed patients than with those who do
not understand the nature of their treatments." Popper, supra note 15, at 826 (describ-
ing why informed consent may have therapeutic value for children). See generally
Bruce J. Winick, Competency To Consent To Treatment: The Distinction Between
Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REV. 15, 46-53 (1991) (advocating the therapeutic
value of having patients informed and involved). When a patient has the freedom to
choose a course of treatment, the decision becomes internalized, giving rise to en-
hanced self-motivation and more effective recovery. See id. at 48-50.
186 See Popper, supra note 15, at 826.
1s7 Id. at 822 (citations omitted).
188 See Levenberg, supra note 156, at 18 (discussing physician confidentiality
and its role in interactions with adolescent patients).
189 See id. (discussing the establishment of relationships with minors over transi-
tion visits where the minors begin taking responsibility for their medical care).
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child who must live with the decision." 190 "[T]he transition from
incapacity to capacity does not occur instantaneously upon
reaching the age of majority."'191
190 See Shield & Baum, supra note 1, at 1183. If the child is hostile to the treat-
ment, she is less likely to comply with the requirements of treatment, which could
result in prolonged illness or injury. See Berg, supra note 84.
191 Berg, supra note 84.
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLES OF QUESTIONS PHYSICIANS
SHOULD ASK WHEN DETERMINING
COMPREHENSION AND MATURITY
How old are you?
Have you ever been hospitalized before or sent to the hospital?
When? Why were you there? Are you allergic to any medication
or have any other medical conditions of which I should be
aware?
[Then, after describing the diagnosis, treatment options, and
risks...)
What treatment do you want? Have you ever had this treatment
before?
Tell me, in your own words, how this treatment is performed.
Are you willing to speak to your parents about this treatment?
Why do you feel uncomfortable about speaking with them?
What are the worst part (risks) of this treatment? What concerns
do you have about the risk? Why are you willing to [accept] the
risk in order to have this treatment done?
What are the other possible treatments? What could you do if
you did not have this treatment performed?
What questions do you have about the treatment?
How will you feel after the treatment (emotionally, physically,
and medically)?
How will you pay for the treatment?
17320001
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How are you going to get home after the appointment? (If it is
not possible for the minor to drive after the operation.)
When are you going to schedule follow-up appointments? How?
